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ABSTRACT: 
US cases concerning Peer-to-Peer technologies (hereafter ‘p2p’) and Digital Rights 
Management (‘DRM’) mechanisms have placed considerable emphasis upon the 
financial interests of right holders, in particular the markets for their copyright works. 
The reason for this is historical – courts have often emphasised the interests of the 
right holder, and furthermore, assumed the interests of the right holder are 
synonymous with encouraging new creative copyright works. However, in the context 
of p2p and DRM, the interests of right holders, authors, and content recipients are in 
pronounced conflict. For this reason, the historically market orientated approach of 
the courts ultimately over emphasise the interests of right holders. This paper suggests 
that an alternative historical approach to copyright infringement in the UK can go 
some way to restoring the copyright balance. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
There has been a trend within recent US copyright cases concerning DRM and p2p 
networks to place considerable emphasis upon the business and market interests of right 
holders.1 In the past, there was not always this emphasis on the right holder. Early UK 
cases concerning primary infringement, to which some seminal US decisions have 
referred,2 focused on the ‘merit’ of the potentially infringing work.3 However, there was a 
                                                 
1 Inter alia Universal City Studios, Inc. v Reimerdes 111 F.Supp. 2d 294 (SDNY, 2000); Universal City Studios, 
Inc. v Corley 273 F.3d 429 (2nd Circuit, 2001); RealNetworks, Inc v Streambox, Inc WLR 127311 (otherwise 
unreported, WD Wash., 2000); A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Circuit, 2001); Metro-
Golden-Meyer Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd. 125 S.Ct. 2764 (Supreme Court, 2005). 
2 Wheaton v Peters  33 U.S. (Pet. 8) 591 (Supreme Court, 1834); Folsom v Marsh 9 F Cas 342 (CCD Mass, 
1841); Stowe v Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853). 
3 Burnett v Chetwood (1721) 35 Eng Rep 1008; Gyles v Wilcox (1741) Barn C 368; Hawkesworth v Newbery 
(1774) referenced in Kaplan, B., ‘An Unhurried View of Copyright’, Columbia University Press, New York 
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competing line of cases that gained increasing influence, and these focused on the 
existing interests of right holders.4 In relation to DRM and p2p, it is that latter approach 
that predominates today, and this has seen an over emphasis upon the interests of right 
holders.5  This paper assesses whether the ‘merit’ based approach would address this 
issue. 
 
By way of explanation as to what is meant by ‘over emphasis’, in Reimerdes6 the US 
Southern District Court of New York considered a program that could act as a method of 
circumventing a DRM mechanism under the DMCA.7 At the start of his judgment, Judge 
Kaplan outlined a perceived conflict between right holders and content recipients.
8
 He 
stated that ‘Congress struck a balance’
9
 between their competing interests. The decision 
was built on an unquestioned assumption of conflict between the interests of right holders 
and the interests of content recipients. At no stage did he question a) whether there was 
necessarily a conflict between the two, and b) whether the balance was being achieved. 
For Judge Kaplan, the issues concerned had simply been decided by Congress.  
 
A similar conflict between the right holder and content recipient was outlined in the 
RealNetworks
10
 case in the Western District of Washington. One of the programs 
involved in the proceedings was a program distributed by Streambox known as the 
Streambox VCR. This would permit content recipients to download and store on their 
computers files normally kept on RealNetworks’ servers. As a result of downloading the 
files, recipients could view them at any future date and in conjunction with other 
programs (such as the Streambox Ripper) could edit the content. Justice Pechman pointed 
out that ‘the Streambox VCR poses a threat to RealNetworks’ relationships with existing 
and potential customers who wish to secure their content for transmission over the 
Internet and must decide whether to purchase and use RealNetworks’ technology.’
11
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1966) at 12. 
4 Sayre v Moore (1785) the report of which is available within Cary v Longman 1 East 357 (1801) at 358; 
Trusler v Murray (KB 1789) 1 Eng Rep. 140, the report of which is also available within Cary v Longman at 
360; Longman v Winchester (1809) 16 Ves Jun 269. 
5 Supra 1. 
6 Universal City Studios, Inc. v Reimerdes (SDNY, 2000) supra 1. 
7 ‘The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’, Pub. L. 105-304, October 28th 1998, 112 Stat. 2860 
8 Universal City Studios, Inc. v Reimerdes, ibid., at 304. 
9 Universal City Studios, Inc. v Reimerdes, ibid. 
10 RealNetworks, Inc v Streambox, Inc (WD Wash., 2000) supra 1.  
11 RealNetworks, Inc v Streambox, Inc  ibid., Para 31 under Findings of Fact. 
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Focus was purely on the relationship between RealNetworks investments and its 
customer base. There was not consideration of whether RealNetworks would stand to 
gain new customers from the use of the Streambox VCR. This failure extends into other 
fields such as secondary liability. In the Ninth Circuit Napster
12
 case Judge Beezer, as 
part of his Fair Use analysis, considered the impact of the Napster file sharing network on 
the existing market. This follows an established line of cases that require the court to 
consider the impact of the use on the existing market.
13
 In affirming the judgment of 
Judge Patel in the District Court, Judge Beezer wrote that Napster harmed the market in 
two distinct ways – in reducing CD sales among college students, and in creating a 
barrier to entry into the digital downloading market.
14
  Judge Beezer did refer to potential 
uses of Napster that could come under the Fair Use defence (such as space shifting
15
) but 
these were denied on the facts. In the District Court, Judge Patel did make some 
references to the extra exposure that some new artists might gain, but that was as far as 
she went. The new works and extra creativity that Napster could encourage was given 
short shrift by Judge Patel. She stated that ‘at least on paper, the promotion of new artists 
constituted an aspect of defendant's [sic] plan as early as October 1999.’
 16 
Nonetheless, 
she was highly sceptical, and proceeded to state that the New Artist Program consisted 
only of a small proportion of Napster use – worse still that it ‘did not become central to 
defendant's [sic] business strategy until this action made it convenient to give the 
program top billing.’
 17
 
  
The lack of consideration of new artists is perhaps surprising considering the importance 
of the staple article of commerce doctrine in Napster. The staple article of commerce 
doctrine permits a potentially infringing device to exist if there are ‘significantly non-
infringing uses’.18 Importantly, these uses may be considered in light of the quality of 
                                                 
12 A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc (9th Circuit, 2001) supra 1 at 1016. 
13 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539 (Supreme Court, 1985) at 566-67. Cited by 
A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc (9th Circuit, 2001) ibid. at 1016. 
14 A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc., ibid., at 1016. 
15 This refers to the ability to transfer existing works to new machines, analogous to ‘time shifting’ - A&M 
Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc ibid., at 1014. 
16 A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc 114 F.Supp.2d 896 (ND Cal., 2000) at 904. 
17 A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc (ND Cal., 2000) ibid., at 904. 
18 Sony Corp. of America v Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (Supreme Court, 1984). 
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such uses rather than simply quantity.
19
 Nevertheless, the Napster judgments focused on 
quantity. Emphasis was placed on the economic loss to the plaintiff and the volume of 
infringing files available. Judge Beezer in the Ninth Circuit focused on a specific quote 
from Sony:  
 
‘A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires 
proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should 
become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for 
the copyrighted work.... If the intended use is for commercial gain, 
that likelihood [of market harm] may be presumed. But if it is for a 
noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.’
20
 
 
However, it should be noted that Judge Beezer’s judgment has already stressed that there 
was commercial gain for Napster. Nearly one third of Judge Beezer’s Fair Use analysis 
looks to the commercial implications of the Fair Use.  
 
The same reasoning is most prominent in the judgment of Justice Souter in Grokster
21
 as 
heard in the Supreme Court. Having mentioned Sony, there is merely a token 
acknowledgement of the encouragement of creativity of certain non-infringing works. 
Justice Souter, for instance, recognized that some musical performers gained new 
audiences by distributing their copyrighted works across peer-to-peer networks for free. 
Furthermore, he noted that non copyright works such as Shakespeare have been 
distributed across these networks, and that StreamCast gave Morpheus users the 
opportunity to download the case briefs.
22
 
 
Though this would suggest that the network encourages non infringing uses, Justice 
Souter stresses the volume of infringement in relation to the Appellants: 
 
                                                 
19 Metro-Golden-Meyer Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd. (Supreme Court, 2005) supra 1 at 2789 (in reference to 
Sony Corp. of America v Universal City Studios, Inc., (Supreme Court, 1984) ibid. 
20 A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc (9th Circuit, 2001) supra 1 at 1016 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. 417 at 451, 
emphasis added by Judge Beezer). 
21 Metro-Golden-Meyer Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd (Supreme Court, 2005) supra 1.. 
22 Metro-Golden-Meyer Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd ibid. at 2772. 
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‘MGM's evidence gives reason [sic] to think that the vast majority of 
users' downloads are acts of infringement, and because well over 100 
million copies of the software in question are known to have been 
downloaded, and billions of files are shared across the FastTrack and 
Gnutella networks each month, the probable scope of copyright 
infringement is staggering.’
23
 
 
However, an approach that initially appears more receptive to the notion of the 
encouragement of non infringing uses is present in the concurring judgment of Justice 
Breyer. He takes a different approach in that he stresses Sony
24
 looks at the quality 
(actual or potential) of non-infringing use, rather than merely quantity. After stressing 
that MGM suggested infringement occurred in 90% of uses, he stated that non infringing 
uses were to account for only a small percentage of Grokster’s users. However, 
notwithstanding this, he continued, the same was true in the Sony case, ‘which 
characterized the relatively limited authorized copying market as ‘substantial’.’25 
 
Justice Breyer appears to be suggesting that there should be a focus on the non infringing 
uses, but the closest he gets to discussing this in depth is when he writes that the Grokster 
software ‘... permits the exchange of any sort of digital file--whether that file does, or 
does not, contain copyrighted material.’26 Consequently, those non infringing uses did 
not receive much attention. 
 
Thus, it still holds true that when the courts openly refer to the business interests of right 
holders, there is an assumption that right holders would not enter a particular market if a 
certain act was occurring. For instance, the rationale of District Judge Kaplan’s judgment 
in Reimerdes
27
 is that there would be no digital videos if there was no DRM in the form 
                                                 
23 Metro-Golden-Meyer Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd ibid. 
24 Sony Corp. of America v Universal City Studios, Inc.,(Supreme Court, 1984) supra 18. 
25 Metro-Golden-Meyer Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd (Supreme Court, 2005) supra 1 at 2789. Note that Judge 
Beezer in A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc (9th Circuit, 2001) supra 1 makes a similar observation, that time 
shifting may necessitate a complete copy (ibid. at 1016). However, the point is not made so eloquently, and 
there is not a link across to infringing works. The statement is kept within the confines of ‘The Portion Used’, 
the third test of Fair Use. 
26 Metro-Golden-Meyer Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd (Supreme Court, 2005) ibid., at 2789.  
27 Universal City Studios, Inc. v Reimerdes (SDNY, 2000) supra 1. 
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of CSS.
28
 In other words, copyright law is being used to protect a publisher’s existing 
interests under the assumption that this encourages new works from that publisher, or 
others in a similar market position. Indeed, the case law does not even refer to wider 
notions of authorship, but merely the right holder (typically a publisher) in the given 
case.
29
 There is an assumption that the existing market model rewarding publishers rather 
than creators directly is sufficient. However, there is a difference between encouraging 
new works and protecting existing business interests. The difference between the interests 
of commercial right holders and creators is not a distinction clearly drawn in the cases 
cited immediately above.  
 
The problem is that such an approach then leads to the assumption that damaging the 
financial interests of right holders is per se to discourage new works. The judgment of 
Justice Souter in the Supreme Court in Grokster
30
 confirms this: 
 
‘The tension between the two values is the subject of this case, with its 
claim that digital distribution of copyrighted material threatens 
copyright holders as never before, because every copy is identical to 
the original, copying is easy, and many people (especially the young) 
use file-sharing software to download copyrighted works ..[thereby] 
fostering disdain for copyright protection.’
31
 
 
The two values being referred to are ‘artistic creativity’ and ‘technological innovation.’
32
 
There is the assumption that right holders and technological innovation are in conflict. 
However, they do not need to be presented as being in conflict. For example, his 
judgment does not consider how Grokster has helped to develop p2p networks, despite 
mentioning ‘technological innovation.’
33
 These networks allow computers to connect 
                                                 
28 Universal City Studios, Inc. v Reimerdes (SDNY, 2000) ibid., at 214. 
29 Acenbach, K., 'Grey Area: How Recent Developments in Digital Music Production Have Necessitated the 
Re-examination of Compulsory Licensing for Sample Based Works' 6 North Carolina Journal of Law and 
Technology 187 (2004), supra 9 and A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc. (9th Circuit, 2001) supra 1. 
30 Metro-Golden-Meyer Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd. (Supreme Court, 2005) supra 1. 
31 Metro-Golden-Meyer Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd. (Supreme Court, 2005) ibid., at 2775. 
32 Metro-Golden-Meyer Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd. ibid., specifically within context: ‘MGM and many of the 
amici fault the Court of Appeals' holding for upsetting a sound balance between the respective values of 
supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection…’ at 2775.  
33 Whilst he highlights the advantages of p2p in Metro-Golden-Meyer Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd. ibid., at 2770, 
he does not develop this further.   
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together directly, and files are distributed between computers allowing for more efficient 
networking. In addition, artistic creativity is treated by Justice Souter as being 
synonymous with current right holders.
34
 The overall approach of courts, in aligning 
protection of business interests with creation of new works, is hardly surprising. The 
lawsuits in question were brought by companies whose interests have been damaged by 
unauthorised reproduction or circumvention.
35
  
 
WHY THE PROTECTION OF THE EXISTING INTERESTS OF RIGHT HOLDERS SHOULD NOT BE 
TREATED AS SYNONYMOUS WITH ENCOURAGING NEW COPYRIGHT WORKS. 
The difference between the existing interests of a right holder and the creation of new 
works are best demonstrated by considering the sorts of things that induce individuals to 
create. First and foremost is that creativity is not always induced by the desire for 
financial reward. This was suggested by Stephen Breyer,
36
 who argued that whilst 
financial rewards are important, they are not the whole story. He suggested that social 
circumstance and social standing may be sufficient reward. An individual may wish to 
simply create for that individual’s own internal needs and wants. Nonetheless, Barry 
Tyerman wrote a particularly damning article which argued Breyer’s views were flawed 
– and he did so by focusing on the financial interests of publishers. He argued that 
publishers needed a safe haven within which to publish their works, to ensure that they 
could get a return for their investment.
37
 However, today the view has changed 
considerably, with Lawrence Lessig, Siva Vaidhyanathan and William Fisher considering 
non-economic rewards to be equally relevant.
38
 Furthermore, they do so by looking 
beyond the economic interests of the publishers. There is evidence of non economic 
reward being a significant factor for those who create remixes of existing works. For 
example, a remake of Star Wars I, known as the ‘Phantom Edit,’ was distributed free of 
                                                 
34 Metro-Golden-Meyer Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd. ibid. at 2775. 
35 Metro-Golden-Meyer Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd. ibid., at 2772,  A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc (9th 
Circuit, 2001) supra 1 at 1016, and RealNetworks, Inc v Streambox, Inc (WD Wash., 2000) supra 1 at Para 31 
under ‘Findings of Fact’. 
36 Breyer, S., ‘The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer 
Programs’, 84 Harvard Law Review 281 (1970). 
37 Tyerman, B., ‘The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection For Published Books: A Reply to Professor 
Breyer’, 18 UCLA Law Review 1100 (1970-71) at 1108-1113. 
38 E.g., Lessig, L, ‘Free Culture: How Big Media uses technology and the law to lock down culture and control 
creativity’, Penguin Press, New York (2004), Vaidhyanathan, S., ‘Copyrights and Copywrongs: The rise of 
Intellectual Property and how it threatens creativity’, 2nd edition, New York University Press, New York, and 
Fisher, W., 'Promises to Keep', Stanford Law and Politics, Stanford (2004). 
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charge over the Internet without the authorisation of the right holder.
39
 Likewise, remakes 
of cartoons such as ‘The Simpsons’ and ‘South Park’ are available over the file sharing 
networks, again not authorised by the right holder. What this serves to show is that there 
can be a distinction between financial rewards and creativity. Some authors may act out 
of a desire for economic reward, but this may not be the only factor. 
 
Additionally, there is a line of US academic writing that stresses the importance of 
famous US works having built upon the works of others. It is often shown that today, 
such actions could constitute copyright infringement. Lawrence Lessig stresses the 
importance of the ‘The Jazz Singer,’ a 1928 film incorporating sound, and how the 
technique was copied into Walt Disney’s ‘Steamboat Willie.’ Likewise, he stresses 
‘Steamboat Willie’ is a parody of ‘Steamboat Bill, Jr.’
40
 Siva Vaidhyanathan in 
‘Copyrights and Copywrongs’
41
 stresses the importance of Delta Blues music in the 
development of rock music, with specific reference to Led Zeppelin.
42
 There is also the 
wider issue of ‘cultural works,’ such as traditional folk music. Anthony McCann suggests 
that copyright law does not take into account the shared nature of the music.
43
 
 
Throughout the history of copyrightable works, there is a history of collaborative 
development.
44
 This collaborative development is not always consistent with the level of 
protection given by copyright. In the examples given immediately above, today there 
would most likely be a breach of copyright. Whilst there may have been copyright issues 
at the time, this did not necessarily prevent the re-use. This paper argues that copyright 
law should consider these reuses rather than over emphasising the existing interests of 
right holders. Furthermore, these interests are based upon past and current financial 
considerations of right holders, rather than potential future right holders.  
                                                 
39 Vaidhyanathan, S., ‘Copyrights and Copywrongs: The rise of Intellectual Property and how it threatens creativity’ 
supra 38  at 77-78.  
40 Lessig, L, ‘Free Culture: How Big Media uses technology and the law to lock down culture and control 
creativity’, supra 38 at p21-28. 
41 Vaidhyanathan, S., ‘Copyrights and Copywrongs: The rise of Intellectual Property and how it threatens 
creativity’, supra 38. 
42 Vaidhyanathan, S., ‘Copyrights and Copywrongs: The rise of Intellectual Property and how it threatens 
creativity’  ibid., at 117-148. 
43 McCann, A., ‘Enclosure without and within the Commons’, 14 Information and Communications Technology 
Law 217 (2005). 
44 Lunsford, A. and Ede, L., ‘Collaborate Authorship and the teaching of writing’, 10 Cardozo Arts and 
Entertainment Law Journal 681 (1992), and the ‘Gowers Review’, HM Treasury, HMSO, London (2006) at 
4.86 
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It would seem an important factor may be the adversarial nature of the legal system, in 
that a right holder brings an action against another party seeking recompense. However, 
that in itself does not explain why the legal system places so much emphasis on the right 
holder’s business interests. Another factor could be the structuring of copyright, for 
which we need to examine the history of copyright law. Recent cases, especially those 
concerning the DMCA such as Corley
45
 and Reimerdes,
46
 utilise the protection of 
business interests as a key element of the balancing exercise. It is posited that this has 
arisen from a specific line of case law, but that an alternate approach could have 
developed which would not have placed such an emphasis upon the supposed conflict 
between right holders and content recipients. To substantiate this, it is suggested that one 
may turn to early UK case law to observe how an alternate approach could have been 
possible. 
 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
Early UK case law relating to copyright was based around the Statute of Anne 1710. 
Before considering this in depth, it should be borne in mind that US and UK law has 
purportedly different aims. In the US, copyright law was ‘To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.’
47
 In the UK, from which 
US copyright derives many principles, it has been described as for ‘the Encouragement of 
Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such 
Copies, during the Times therein mentioned.’
48
 Whilst the foundations of US and UK law 
are radically different – US law being based on the idealistic views of the founding 
fathers, UK law being essentially based around the history of the monopoly of the 
Stationers’ Company – both have developed a notion of balancing.  
 
                                                 
45 Universal City Studios, Inc. v Corley (2nd Circuit, 2001) supra 1. 
46 Universal City Studios, Inc. v Reimerdes (SDNY, 2000) supra 1. 
47 The United States Constitution, Article I Section 8. 
48 Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Anne Ch 19., the long title of which is ‘An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 
by vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein 
mentioned’(hereafter ‘the Statute of Anne’). 
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When observing the development of early UK case law, it can be seen that two distinct 
approaches to balancing developed. Where abridgement or translation had been an issue 
in proceedings, the Judges tended to focus on the potentially infringing work and whether 
this contained some element of ‘merit.’ On the other hand, if the case was an 
infringement proceeding where abridgement or translation was not an issue, then the 
focus was more narrowly on the degree of similarity. The latter approach was to become 
dominant, sidelining an approach that would have placed less emphasis on the business 
interests of right holders. 
 
ABRIDGEMENTS AND TRANSLATIONS. 
In the UK, it was only prior to the Copyright Act 1911
49
 that abridgements and 
translations were not infringements of copyright per se. In 1721, Lord Macclesfield in 
Burnett v Chetwood
50
 considered whether a translation of Archaeologiae Philosophicae 
was possible without infringing copyright held under the Statute of Anne. Lord 
Macclesfield argued ‘a translation might not be the same with the reprinting the original 
[sic], on account that the translator had bestowed his care and pains upon it, and so not 
within the prohibition of the Act.’
51
 The implication here was that, according to Kaplan 
(interpreting Burnett), ‘if the accused book was a work of authorship, it could not at the 
same time infringe.’
52
 In Hawkesworth v Newbery
53
  Lord Chancellor Apsley discussed 
the potentially infringing work as being ‘in the nature of a new work,’
54
 and he stated that 
an abridgement was ‘not an act of plagiarism upon the original work, nor against any 
property in it, but an allowable and meritorious work.’
55
 As was noted in Donaldson v 
Beckett,
 56
 ‘abridgments [sic] of books, translations, notes, all effectively deprive the 
                                                 
49 Copyright Act 1911, 1&2 Geo. V, c.46. 
50 Burnett v Chetwood (1721) supra 3. 
51 Burnett v Chetwood ibid, at 1009.  
52 Kaplan, B., ‘An Unhurried View of Copyright’, supra 3 at 10. Note that Lord Macclesfield ultimately 
requests for the injunction on other grounds.  
53 Hawkesworth v Newbery (1774) supra 3. 
54 Hawkesworth v Newbery ibid.. 
55 Hawkesworth v Newbery ibid., quoted in Deazley, R., ‘Rethinking Copyright: History, Theory, Language’, 
Edward Elgar, Oxford (2006) at 26 which in turn is quoting from Lofft, C., Reports of Cases adjudged in the 
Court of King’s Bench, 12 Geo. 3-14 Geo. 3, Owen, London (1776). 
56 The Hansard Report of Donaldson v Beckett , reported as ‘Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of 
Literary Property, 14 Geo III 1st Ser. 17 950 (1774). 
 11 
 
original author of the fruit of his labours, as direct particular copies, yet they are 
allowable.’
57
 
 
However, there is an uncertainty apparent as to how to maintain that approach. In Gyles v 
Wilcox,
58
 Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, having briefly referred to the stated aim of the 
Statute of Anne – “the encouragement of learning,” 59  began to shift away from the 
consideration of this aim. This he did initially by stating that the ‘…Act is not to be 
construed strictly, but according to the Intention of the Legislature: However, the 
intention must be formed from the words of the Statute.’
60
 What that caused was a shift 
of focus – the question quickly became ‘Whether the second Book has been the same 
Book with the former?’,
61
 namely whether the abridgement is ‘a Work of Judgment.’
62
  
 
Interestingly, in Gyles,
63
 Lord Chancellor Hardwicke stated that he did not wish to 
become involved in issues of fact.
64
  He leaves the issue of comparing the books to the 
Master. The structure of the judgment implied that he believed the proper place of the 
Judge is to consider the broader societal issues of copyright – namely, the 
‘encouragement of learning,’ but he is hamstrung by the need to resolve the specific issue 
of infringement. Throughout his judgment, there is the sense of considerable unease 
present, as if he feels unable to discuss the societal implications of copyright because of 
the adversarial nature of the infringement action brought before him.
65
  
 
Whilst the approach in these abridgement cases was to place emphasis upon the ‘merit’ of 
the potentially infringing work, there is an underlying unease as to how to balance the 
interests of the author of the original work vis-à-vis the interests of the author of the 
                                                 
57 The Hansard Report of Donaldson v Beckett , reported as ‘Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of 
Literary Property, ibid., at 990, per Lord Chief Justice De Grey. 
58 Gyles v Wilcox (1741) supra 3.  
59 Gyles v Wilcox ibid. at 368. 
60 Gyles v Wilcox ibid. 
61 Gyles v Wilcox ibid., at 369. 
62 Gyles v Wilcox ibid. 
63 Gyles v Wilcox (1741) supra 3. 
64 ‘Lord Chancellor said, that the best way was to leave all Matters in Difference to the Arbitration of those two 
Counsel, and if they should not be able to make an Award, that they then should have Liberty to choose an 
Umpire’ Gyles v Wilcox, ibid. at 370. 
65 ‘Whether the second Book is the same Book with the former is a Matter of Fact, and a Fact of Difficulty to be 
Determined. It is hard to say in what Manner the Court ought to determine this Fact; and his Lordship said he 
could not see how it could be determined but by reading both the Books over, and that it would be hardly 
proper for him to do….’ Gyles v Wilcox, ibid. at 370. 
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abridgement. This was enhanced by the fact that the approach towards balancing, where 
there was no abridgement, was quite different from where there was. In these cases, the 
balancing exercise was more to do with comparison of the works and damage to the 
original author, than the merit of the infringing work.  
 
Ultimately, abridgements and translations continued to be treated differently until the 
Copyright Act 1911, which implemented UK obligations under the Berne Convention 
1886.
66
 There was a slight sea change occurring in certain cases of infringement which 
emphasised the author’s proprietary interests, and these are discussed in the following 
section. Later cases such as Dickens v Lee67, and Tinsley v Lacy68 began to explicitly 
criticise the existence of the cases dealing with abridgements, simply because cases 
dealing with abridgements did not base themselves around protecting existing author’s 
interests. The proprietary approach reached its most prominent form in a report by the 
1875 UK Copyright Commission, who vociferously opposed the specific approach used 
for abridgements due to the harm that occurred to right holder’s markets.
69
 However, 
before considering this in detail, the history of the approach of courts towards 
infringement – the approach that became dominant - will be considered. The reasons for 
the decline of the approach based on the ‘merit’ of the potentially infringing work will be 
considered thereafter. 
 
CASES HELD TO BE NOT INVOLVING ABRIDGEMENTS OR TRANSLATIONS. 
The approach in cases not involving abridgements or translations was typically quite 
different from those that did. In contrast to Burnett v Chetwood,
70
 or Gyles v Wilcox,
71
 
the focus was considerably more upon the damage to the original right holder. For 
instance, in 1785, one such case was Sayre v Moore.
72
 The ‘charts that had been copied 
                                                 
66 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,  which was revised in 
Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986)  [The 1979 amended version 
does not appear in UNTS or ILM, but the 1971 Paris revision is available at 1161 UNTS 30 (1971)]. 
67 Dickens v Lee (1844) 8 Jurist 183. 
68 Tinsley v Lacy (1863) 71 Eng Rep 327. 
69 De Zwart, M., ‘A historical analysis of the birth of fair dealing and fair use: lessons for the digital age’ [2007] 
IPQ 60 at 77; Nimmer, D., Silman, S., Skone James, E., Skone James, R. (eds), ‘Copinger and Skone James on 
Copyright’, 13th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London (1991) at 1-39. 
70 Burnett v Chetwood (1721) supra 3. 
71 Gyles v Wilcox (1741) supra 3. 
72 Sayre v Moore (1785) supra 4. 
 13 
 
were four in number, which Moore had made into one large map.’
73
 Lord Mansfield 
declared in relation to an action for infringement in the copyright of a map that: 
 
‘we must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; 
the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for the 
service of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, 
and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world 
may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be 
retarded.’
74
 
 
In Trusler v Murray
75
 reference is made to liability where 14 pages of an infringing book 
of chronology were reproduced in their entirety, and this was sufficient to make the 
defendant liable. A test that is more similar in nature to current copyright law was put 
forward in Longman v Winchester,
76
 where Lord Chancellor Eldon stated that where 
there was an infringing publisher, ‘there is no doubt, that this Court would interpose to 
prevent a mere republication of a work, which the labour and skill of another person had 
supplied to the world.’
77
 Although the same Lord Chancellor states one year later in 
Wilkins v Aikin
78
 that ‘the question on the whole is, whether this is a legitimate use of the 
Plaintiff’s publication, in the fair exercise of a mental operation, deserving the character 
of the original work,’
79
 it has to be stressed that this case has much discussion of what 
would today be considered issues of independent creation. The key point is that these 
cases of infringement mark a shift away from a focus on whether a copy is in some form 
‘meritorious,’ and instead emphasise what has been reproduced. In the early case of 
Burnett,
80
 a potentially infringing work could avoid liability provided an author ‘had 
bestowed his care and pains upon it.’
81
 This is in stark contrast to later cases such as 
Sayre v Moore.
82
 
                                                 
73 Sayre v Moore ibid., at 360. 
74 Sayre v Moore ibid., at 362. 
75 Trusler v Murray (1789) supra 4. 
76 Longman v Winchester (1809) supra 4. 
77 Longman v Winchester ibid., at 269. 
78 Wilkins v Aikin (1810) 17 Ves Jun 422. 
79 Wilkins v Aikin  ibid., at 426. 
80 Burnett v Chetwood (1721) supra 3. 
81 Burnett v Chetwood ibid., at 1009. 
82 Sayre v Moore  (1785) supra 4. 
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THE RESULT. 
The incompatibility of these two approaches was becoming increasingly clear. For 
instance in Tinsley v Lacy
83
 of 1868, it was stated by Vice Chancellor Sir Page Wood 
that: 
 
‘The authorities by which fair abridgements have been sanctioned have 
no application. The court has gone far enough in that direction; and it is 
difficult to acquiesce in the reason sometimes given, that the compiler of 
an abridgement is a benefactor to mankind, by assisting in the diffusion of 
knowledge.’
84
 
 
The approach of earlier courts focusing on the merit of the potentially infringing work 
simply did not sit well with the notion that the original author should be protected by 
copyright. Those cases involving abridgements and translations were much less 
commonplace than those that were not, and momentum was behind those who argued 
focus should be on the original author.
85
 The consequence was that in 1878 the conflict 
was specifically addressed by the 1875 UK Copyright Commission: 
 
‘At present an abridgement may or may not be an infringement of 
copyright, according to the use made of the original work and the extent 
to which the latter is merely copied into the abridgement. But even 
though an abridgement may be so framed as to escape being a piracy, still 
it is capable of doing great harm to the author of the work, by interfering 
with his market; and it is more likely to interfere with that market and 
injure the sale of the original work if, as is frequently the case, it bears in 
its title the name of the original author. We think this should be 
prevented; and upon the whole we recommend that no abridgements of 
                                                 
83 Tinsley v Lacy (1863)71 Eng Rep 327. 
84 Tinsley v Lacy ibid., at 330. 
85 Vaver, D., ‘Abridgments and Abstracts’, [1995] European Intellectual Property Review 225 at 227. 
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copyright works should be allowed during the term of copyright without 
the consent of the owner of the copyright.’
86
 
 
With the passing of the Copyright Act 1911, abridgement was not mentioned under the 
heading of ‘Fair Dealing’. That part of the Act sought to codify the existing common law. 
For the reasons given by the UK Copyright Commission, abridgement was subsumed 
within the broader rules of copyright infringement that ran under the reproduction right 
and to a lesser degree with the new adaptation rights.
87
 The old approach of looking at the 
‘merit’ of an infringing work had simply become sidelined by cases such as Dickens
88
 
and Tinsley
89
 which emphasised the interests of the author of the original work. The 
result was that the focus of the balancing exercise centred even more upon the existing 
interests of a right holder.  
 
THE US BALANCING EXERCISE: WHAT LED TO THE FOCUS ON THE RIGHTS HOLDER? 
Early copyright law cases in the US have made reference to equivalent cases in the UK. 
In the seminal case of Wheaton v Peters
90
 in 1834, the US Supreme Court referred to the 
case of Donaldson v Beckett
91
 in relation to its general findings
92
 and came to a 
consistent conclusion. Indeed, as with the UK, by turning to the history of copyright it is 
possible to find alternative approaches to balancing. Prior to the constitutional convention 
and Federal Copyright Act of 1790, there were a number of divergent approaches. Some 
State copyright Acts, such as those of Massachusetts and New Jersey, emphasised 
knowledge and learning, albeit by securing the author’s rights. Five – Connecticut, South 
Carolina, North Carolina, Georgia and New York - even restricted the market prices of 
books as it was required ‘for the encouragement of learning, that the inhabitants of this 
                                                 
86 De Zwart, M., ‘A historical analysis of the birth of fair dealing and fair use: lessons for the digital age’ supra 
69 at 77. A discussion of the issues here are also in Roberts, H., ‘The Law of Abridgment of Copyrighted 
Literary Material’, 30 Kentucky Law Journal 298 (1942). 
87 The relevant sections were under s1(2)(a), (b) and (c) of the Copyright Act 1911 which were brought together 
as adaptation under s2(5) and s.2(6)(a) Copyright Act 1956, De Zwart, M.,‘A historical analysis of the birth of 
fair dealing and fair use: lessons for the digital age’, ibid., at 78. 
88 Dickens v Lee (1844) 8 Jurist 183. 
89 Tinsley v Lacy supra 83. 
90 Wheaton v Peters  (Supreme Court, 1834) supra 2. 
91 Donaldson v Beckett supra 56. 
92 Wheaton v Peters  (Supreme Court, 1834) supra 2 at 656, 656, 678, 686 and 690. 
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State be furnished with useful books, &c., at reasonable prices.’
93
 The emphasis on 
learning is perhaps most prominent in the constitutional provision itself, where Patterson 
focuses on the contributions of Madison and Pinckney, both of whom in their 
submissions to the Constitutional Convention emphasised knowledge.
94
  
 
However, the focus shifts dramatically in the Federal Copyright Act 1790. Although, 
similar to the UK’s Statute of Anne in 1710, it begins with a title of ‘An Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning…’; s.2 of 1790 Act indicates that the purpose of the statute 
was to protect works from piracy. Patterson submits that the only explanation for such a 
change is ‘a confusion of ideas, and there is indication of such a confusion.’
95
    
 
Unlike Gyles
96
 in the UK, the equivalent US case of Folsom v Marsh
97
 (1841) focuses 
much more upon the market of the original work. This case also concerned abridgement. 
Justice Story stated that ‘we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the 
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, 
and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work.’
98
  
 
These points of analysis were followed in subsequent case law
99
 leading to what became 
the codification of Fair Use in §107 of the United States Code.
100
 In the 1985 case of 
Harper & Row v Nation Enterprises,
101
 the US Supreme Court stated: 
 
‘We agree with the Court of Appeals that copyright is intended to 
increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge.’
102
 
 
                                                 
93 Patterson, L.R., ‘Copyright in Historical Perspective’ Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville (1968) at 189. 
94 Patterson, L.R., ‘Copyright in Historical Perspective’ ibid., at 193. 
95 Patterson, L.R., ‘Copyright in Historical Perspective’ ibid., at 200. 
96 Gyles v Wilcox (1741) supra 3. 
97 Folsom v Marsh (CCD Mass, 1841) supra 2. 
98 Folsom v Marsh ibid. at 348. 
99 Cohen, J.E.,  ‘Copyright in a global information economy’, Aspen Law & Business, New York (2002) at 493, 
noting that the term ‘Fair Use’ first arose in Lawrence v Dana 15 F Cas 26 at 60 (CCD Mass., 1869).  
100 17 USC §107. 
101 Harper & Row v Nation Enterprises 471 US 539 (Supreme Court, 1985). 
102 Harper & Row v Nation Enterprises ibid., at 545. 
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The Supreme Court focused upon its previous ruling in Sony v Universal City Studios,
103
 
but Sony emphasises the interests of the right holder. Despite the fact that Sony is often 
cited as a case which takes into account the wider public interest because it permits time 
shifting,
104
 it is firmly rooted within the conflict between the parties. Sony may initially 
appear to consider wider social issues, but it is not as wide as, say, the UK case of 
Gyles.
105
 It was said in Sony, in the Supreme Court, that  
 
‘[This] limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose 
may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of 
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to 
allow the public access to the products of their genius after a limited 
period of exclusive control has expired.’
106
 
 
The statement may refer to the public interest, but that interest is met by limiting the 
granted period of protection. This should be compared to the UK’s Gyles case, which as 
mentioned above, questions whether a potentially infringing work is a ‘Work of 
Judgment,’
107
 and furthermore, also discusses the potential meaning of the phrase 
‘encouragement of learning’ as used in the Statute of Anne. Gyles considers the wider 
potential ‘educational’ impact of the new Act, which as explicitly noted by the Lord 
Chancellor, was not to be considered the same as protecting a Monopoly.
108
 Sony, by 
contrast, focuses firstly upon a limited period of protection for right holders. This 
emphasis has led to insufficient consideration of the merit of potentially infringing works. 
 
AN ASSUMPTION THAT PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF RIGHT HOLDERS IS SYNONYMOUS WITH 
THE INTERESTS OF PUBLISHERS. 
Having now established that there has been increasing emphasis upon existing works 
rather than the ‘merit’ of the potentially infringing work, focus should now turn to 
                                                 
103 Sony Corp. of America v Universal City Studios, Inc., (Supreme Court, 1984) supra 18. 
104 E.g. Lessig, L., ‘The Future of Ideas’, Random House, New York (2001) at 195; Biegel, S., ‘Beyond Our 
Control?’, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (2001) at 297-301; statement only of the resulting rule - 
Litman, J., ‘Digital Copyright’, Prometheus Books, New York (2001) at 131. 
105 Gyles v Wilcox (1741) supra 3. 
106 Sony Corp. of America v Universal City Studios, Inc., (Supreme Court, 1984) supra 18 at 429. 
107 Gyles v Wilcox (1741) supra 3 at 369. 
108 Gyles v Wilcox ibid.,at 368. 
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considering why the existing work has been of such importance. Why has the right holder 
been deemed so important – and who is the right holder?  
 
Even in a case that considers the broader policy implication of copyright, such as Millar v 
Taylor,
109
 parties directly representing the author were not present. As Kaplan notes, 
‘The fact that publishers, not authors, were at bar, was passed over as usual.’
110
 The same 
was true in Sayre v Moore.
111
 Lord Mansfield’s judgment states that ‘The [Statute of 
Anne] secures copy-right to authors and guards against the piracy of words and 
sentiments,’ 112  but the case was brought by a plaintiff company who employed an 
individual whose work could have been infringed, 113  and the defendant was also a 
publisher.114 
 
This is of critical importance in infringement cases where the balancing exercise is 
comparing an earlier work to a later work. This is because these cases tend to emphasise 
the financial implications of permitting an infringement to continue. For instance, in 
Sayre it was stated that ‘…the plaintiffs had originally been at a great expense in 
procuring materials for those maps,’
115
 likewise in Longman v Winchester
116
 it was stated 
that ‘the latter publisher cannot on that account be justified in sparing himself the labour 
and expense of an actual survey.’
117
 
 
IN THE UK: THE FOCUS ON THE PUBLISHER 
Copyright law has to be seen within the context of previous laws concerning the 
Stationers’ Company’s Monopoly. The Stationers’ Company, from the sixteenth century 
through to the collapse of the Licensing Act in 1695, operated within a system of 
censorship in which the quasi official Stationers’ Company administered the publication 
of works. ‘Printing was confined to members of the Stationers’ Company and such others 
                                                 
109 Millar v Taylor (1768) 98 Eng Rep 201. 
110 Kaplan, B., ‘An Unhurried View of Copyright’ supra 3 at 13. 
111 Sayre v Moore  (1785) supra 4. 
112 Sayre v Moore ibid., at 361. 
113 ‘Delarcohett, an eminent geographer and engraver, had been employed by the plaintiffs…’Sayre v Moore, 
ibid. 
114 ‘Winterfelt, an engraver, said he was actually employed by the defendants to take a draft of the Gulph 
Passage (in the West Indies) from the plaintiffs maps’ Sayre v Moore, ibid. 
115 Sayre v Moore, ibid. 
116 Longman v Winchester  (1809) supra 4. 
117 Longman v Winchester ibid., at 271. 
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as might be authorized by the Queen.’
118
 The Stationers’ Company was, in some respects, 
the representative of the original author vis-à-vis the court system and the crown.  
 
The Stationers’ Company and booksellers
119
 had suffered a serious blow with the failure 
to renew the Licensing Act. Due to a fall out of favour with Parliament,
120
 the groups put 
their support behind the notion of the author. In a pamphlet published in 1707, the 
London booksellers emphasised the negative effect of disorder due to a lack of legal 
regulation, and the effect this would have on authors: 
 
‘Many learned Men have spent much Time, and been at great Charges, 
in composing Books, who used to dispose of their Copies upon 
valuable Considerations, to be printed by the Purchasers…but of late 
Years such Properties have been much invaded, by other Persons 
printing the same Books…to the great Discouragement of Persons 
from writing Matters, that might be of great Use to the Publick, [sic] 
and to the great Damage of Proprietors.’
121
 
 
After further political manoeuvrings, this ultimately paved the way for what was to 
become known as the Statute of Anne. Though the Statute of Anne referred to ‘Authors 
or Purchasers’,
122
 it soon became clear that the relationship between the two was 
                                                 
118 Kaplan, B., ‘An Unhurried View of Copyright’ supra 3 at 3, and also see Arber, E., (ed) ‘A transcript of the 
registers of the company of Stationers of London, 1554-1640, privately printed (volume I), London (1967) at 
xxxi (introduction). 
119 It is prudent to explain why the description ‘book sellers’ is initially used, and later the description 
‘publishers’. ‘The familiar three-part division of the modern book trade into publisher-wholesaler, printer, and 
retail bookseller (who might also be wholesalers and/or printers) remained normal during the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century, but syndicates tended to become smaller as their members gained in financial strength .. and 
around 1800 a few of the larger men .. began to publish on their own.’ Gaskell, P., ‘A New Introduction to 
Bibliography’, OUP, Oxford (1972) at 297. 
120 Deazley, R., ‘Rethinking Copyright: History, Theory, Language’, supra 55 at 1-2, Bowker, R., ‘Copyright: 
Its History and Law’, Houghton Mifflin and Company, Boston and New York (1912) at 22, Kaplan, B., ‘An 
Unhurried View of Copyright’ supra 3 at 89, Patterson, L.R., ‘Copyright in Historical Perspective’  supra  93 at 
138-140 (without reference to the changing position of the House of Lords, who ultimately decided not to 
renew the Licensing Act following the lead of the House of Commons),  Nimmer, D., Silman, S., Skone James, 
E., Skone James, R. (eds), ‘Copinger and Skone James on Copyright’, 13th edition, supra 69 at 1-29 and Rose, 
M., 'Authors and Owners', Harvard University Press, Massachusetts (1993) at 32-34. 
121 ‘Craigie, John et al., ‘Reports of Cases Decided in the House of Lords, upon Appeal from Scotland, from 
1726 – 1822’, Edinburgh 1849-1943. 5 Vols.’ at 313, quoted by Rose, M., ‘Authors and Owners,’ ibid., at 36, 
with the reference ‘CJ 15:313.’ 
122 As referred to in the long title, and s1 of the Statute of Anne 1710. For the original copy of the Act, see 
http://copyright-project.law.cam.ac.uk/cgi-
bin/kleioc/0010/exec/showThumb/%22uk_1710%22/start/%22yes%22 last accessed on 19th January 2009. 
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insufficiently articulated. ‘Purchasers’ had put themselves behind the ideal of the 
‘Author’, in the full knowledge that authors invariably assigned all their interests to the 
‘Purchaser’.
123
 As Feather states, ‘its most immediate effect was that it ensured the 
continued dominance of English publishing by a few London Firms, and their continued 
and ever increasing prosperity’,
124
 and ‘to a large extent the act recognized the role of the 
company under existing common law (and like the Statute of Monopolies, in many ways 
codified existing practice).’
125
 Furthermore, the Statute itself did not develop any 
distinctions between the author and publisher – it merely refers to ‘Authors or 
Purchasers’.
126
 In many cases the financial damage to a publisher was equated to 
financial damage to an author.
127
 Even in cases such as Millar v Taylor
128
 there was no 
person specifically representing the interests of the author.
129
   
 
The failure to develop a distinction was a direct product of the historical period. It was 
common practice for authors to assign works to publishers.
130
 Nor was it necessarily 
uncommon for authors to assign their works between one another - and for these 
assignations not to be mentioned within the work itself.
131
 It is therefore easy to see how 
the failure to make a distinction between Purchasers and Authors could have occurred. As 
we have seen, in infringement actions there has been a predominant trend to associate 
financial and business interests with creativity – in practice, to place an emphasis on the 
‘Purchaser’ rather than the ‘Author’ – and this may be traced back to the Statute of Anne.  
                                                 
123 Kaplan, B., ‘An Unhurried View of Copyright’ supra 3, at 8-9 ‘I think it nearer the truth to say that 
publishers saw the tactical advantage of putting forward authors’ interests together with their own, and this 
tactic produced some effect on the tone of the statute’. 
124 Feather, J., ‘The Book Trade in Politics’ 8 Publishing History 19 (1980) at 37. Note that Deazley, R., refutes 
this as ‘[Feather’s analysis does not take sufficient account of those features within the new legislation that 
conflicted with the interest of the established trade’ (Deazley, R., ‘On the Origin of the Right to Copy’, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford (2004) at 45). However, it cannot be denied that the London Booksellers retained a 
monopoly as a result of this act and had put their support behind the notion of the author, see Kaplan, B., ‘An 
Unhurried View of Copyright’, ibid., Feather, J., at 36 and Deazley, R., ‘On the Origin of the Right to Copy’ at 
44. 
125 May, C., and Sell, S., ‘Intellectual Property Rights: A critical history’, Lynne Rienner, London (2006) at 91. 
126 The Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Anne Ch 19. 
127 In relation to the situation in the US, Patterson puts it thus: ‘..because copyright was deemed to be wholly an 
author’s right, even though it was available as well to the publisher, the lawmakers did not make the necessary 
distinctions between the publisher’s interest and the author’s interest which would have enabled them to deal 
directly with the danger of monopoly’  Patterson, ‘Copyright in historical perspective’ supra 93at 217. 
128 Millar v Taylor (1768), supra 109. 
129 Kaplan, B., ‘An Unhurried View of Copyright’ supra 3 at 13 ‘(The fact that publishers, not authors, were at 
bar, was passed over in silence, as usual)’. 
130 Feather, J., ‘The Book Trade in Politics’ supra 124.  
131 See Woodmansee, M., 'On the author effect: Recovering collectivity', 10 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment 
Law Journal 279 (1992) at 282-3. 
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THE POSITION IN THE US IN RELATION TO THE AUTHOR / PUBLISHER DIVIDE. 
With regard to the United States, the title of the Copyright Act 1790 is similar to the 
Statute of Anne. It also fails to make the distinction between authors and publishers. As 
the long title states, this was an act: 
 
‘... for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, 
Charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during 
the times therein mentioned.’
132
 
 
Patterson suggests that, in the US, this failure led to an emphasis upon the issue of 
duration of a copyright. He submits that the duration of copyright increased because the 
lawmakers ‘attempted to deal with ... [the problem of monopoly] ... indirectly, by limiting 
the author’s rights – an attempt which failed because the idea of the author’s natural 
rights led to an expansion of the monopoly of copyright.’
133
 Patterson goes further and 
also writes: 
 
‘The ignoring of the publisher’s interest in copyright led to the facile 
assumption that copyright was concerned with only two major interests, 
those of the author and the public. The fact that the publisher was ignored 
did not change the fact that copyright is concerned with three major 
interests, those of the author, the publisher, and the public.’
134
 
 
The end result is that there is an alignment of the interests of a publisher and the interests 
of the author. As an aside, it is useful to note that a similar issue has arisen in Canada. 
This is a strikingly clear example of how there can be a lack of enunciation in case law of 
the differing interests of the authors and publishers. Canada is a Commonwealth country, 
and it still often cites UK case law as persuasive authority. In Théberge v Galerie d’Art 
du Petit Champlain,
 135
  in the Supreme Court of Canada, Binnie J stated that ‘…the 
                                                 
132 Copyright Act 1790, 1 Stat. 124.  
133 Patterson, L.R., ‘Copyright in Historical Perspective’, supra 93 at 217. 
134 Patterson, L.R., ‘Copyright in Historical Perspective’, ibid., at 216-217. 
135 Théberge v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain [2002] 2 SCR 336, 2002 SCC 34. 
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initial Copyright Act, 1709 (UK), 8 Ann., c. 21, was passed to assuage the concerns of 
printers, not authors.’
136
 However, the differing interests of printers and authors are not 
clarified. For instance, pages 23-24 interchangeably use the term ‘creator,’ ‘artists and 
authors’ and ‘holders of copyrights’ without clarification as to their differences. The 
following Canadian case, CCH v Law Society of Upper Canada,
137
 (also of the Supreme 
Court of Canada) suffers from the same issue, for instance page 16 of that judgment 
quotes Binnie J in Théberge referring to creators, but then immediately refers to ‘owners 
and users’ as a way of expressing the copyright balance. Page 17 states that ‘the 
exceptions to copyright infringement [are] perhaps more properly understood as users’ 
rights.’
138
 Notwithstanding this, the underlying distinction between a user, creator, and 
right holder is not clearly defined. As Scassa is hinting at, in reference to the judgment of 
Linden J.A. in CCH, ‘although user’s rights may be a shorthand for many of these 
interests, it is a shorthand which underplays the range and depth of interests.’
139
 These 
approaches have serious implications for the copyright balancing exercise, since as 
outlined above, many cases over emphasise the financial interests of the originator of a 
work. 
 
THE CONSEQUENCE OF COURTS NO LONGER PLACING SUCH EMPHASIS UPON THE MERIT OF THE 
POTENTIALLY INFRINGING WORK & CONCLUDING THOUGHTS. 
The focus of courts on the existing interests of right holders has led to insufficient 
consideration that, with the Internet, ‘social interactions are turned into information 
exchanges on email, chats, and online portals’
140
 – interactions that can lead to new 
thoughts (and by implication, new copyright works). Shneiderman stresses this 
throughout his work, ‘Leonardo’s Laptop.’
141
 He posits that many social functions, such 
as holding discussions and distributing photos, could become inhibited by not focusing 
on ‘human needs.’
142
 The development of technology permits more varied and 
widespread interactions between individuals. Individuals can utilise and build upon the 
                                                 
136 Théberge v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain ibid., at p.15. 
137 CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada [2004] 1 SCR 339, 2004 SCC 13, at p.16. 
138 CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada ibid., at p.17. 
139 Scassa, T., ‘Interests in the Balance’, in Geist, M., ‘In the Public Interest’, Irwin Law, Ontario (2005) at 50 
140 Chamberlain Group, Inc. v Skylink Technologies, Inc ibid., at 80. 
141 Shneiderman, B., 'Leonardo's Laptop', MIT Press, Massachusetts (2002). 
142 Shneiderman, B., ibid., at 76, Chapter 5 generally and for an exposition of the theory, 81, and 87-99. 
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works of other individuals in order to more accurately and easily express themselves. 
While it could be suggested that such social functions will still occur outside of the 
digital realm,
143
 there are a number of reasons why the law should encourage more reuses 
of content, even if that content is currently protected by copyright. For instance, 
philosopher John Locke stressed that all knowledge is based on experience,
144
 and the 
logical conclusion of this is that the more experience an individual can gain, the greater 
the extent of knowledge – ‘the memory is not always so clear as actual perception.’
145
 
Likewise, in terms of artists, especially musicians, we may refer to the use of Delta Blues 
music by Led Zeppelin; and of hip hop music sampling.
146
 The Beastie Boys used 
sampling in their album ‘Paul’s Boutique’, as did Verve in ‘Bitter Sweet Symphony’. The 
Gowers Report points out, in rather strong terms, ‘ ‘Good artists borrow; great artists 
steal’ so said Pablo Picasso, borrowing from Igor Stravinsky, or perhaps from T.S. 
Elliot.’
147
 The point is that taking what has gone before does not necessarily result in less 
creativity, even though there is potential for harm to occur to a right holder. If the law is 
to encourage such re-use, and to encourage the creation of knowledge that this may bring, 
it is imperative for the law to make a clear distinction between publishers and authors 
who may, by refashioning existing works, enter into competition with the publishers 
unless an appropriate legal framework is set out.  
 
In relation to the historical development of copyright law, it was highlighted that early 
UK case law focused upon the ‘merit’ of the potentially infringing work. To reassert this 
approach within the modern context of copyright law could serve to limit the emphasis 
upon the interests of right holders, and lead to a clearer demarcation between right 
holders as assignees, and authors as assignors. By way of example, in relation to the 
Grokster network, it would have required much more emphasis upon the way in which 
the primary infringers (potential authors) were adding merit to existing copyright works 
owned by right holders. Such an approach could be mandated by legislation. Statute 
                                                 
143 Shneiderman uses digital technology show how distributing photos could occur in the real world, but that 
digital technology could distribute them more quickly to more people, and permit distribution of those altered 
versions, Shneiderman, B., 'Leonardo's Laptop' supra 141 at 96.  
144 Locke, J., ‘An Essay concerning human understanding’, Book II, Chapter 1 at §2. 
145 Locke, J., ‘An Essay concerning human understanding’, ibid., Book IV, Chapter 1 at §9.  
146 Vaidhyanathan, S., ‘Copyrights and Copywrongs: The rise of Intellectual Property and how it threatens 
creativity’ supra 38 at 117-145; McLeod, K., ‘Freedom of Expression’, Doubleday, New York (2005) at 62-113. 
147 ‘Gowers Review’, supra 44 at p.67. 
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could lay down that courts must question the merit of a potentially infringing work, and 
to then consider this as part of the balance between right holders and authors before a 
finding of infringement is reached. A provision could be inserted into the US code 
requiring this, between 17 USC §106 and §107. This would encourage the courts to 
consider broader balancing issues. 
 
The ‘merit’ criterion should also not just be limited in its application to primary copyright 
infringement. The principle could also be applied to secondary liability, by explicitly 
requiring it in 17 USC §107. In a case such as Grokster, 148  this might involve 
consideration of the merit of the Grokster network in the dissemination of either 
infringing yet meritorious works, or other non infringing works. Likewise, the court 
could consider other uses of the network – for instance, how the technology has fed into 
the development of VOIP and distributed computing. In Grokster, the Supreme Court 
would thus have been required to consider these factors vis-a-vis their finding of 
inducement of copyright infringement. 
 
In utilising this ‘merit’ based approach, the current tendency of courts to focus on the 
existing interests of the right holder, with extremely limited consideration of whether this 
actually encourages new copyright works, will be reduced. No longer will the interests of 
the publisher or distributor simply be considered analogous to the interests of creators of 
new copyrightable works. The danger of the current approach is neatly summed up by 
Hughes: 
‘Once we recognize that property is needed to motivate work for the 
public good, we may transform the reward into a right just as we often 
convert systematically granted benefits into rights deserved by the 
recipients. Perhaps we do this because it would be inconsistent and 
disconcerting to say that some systematically granted benefit is not 
deserved. Perhaps we just make the transition from instrumental to 
normative propositions through lack of attention. For example, in the 
1954 case Mazer v. Stein, the Court said: 
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‘The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress 
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement 
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance 
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors . . . 
Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards 
commensurate with the services rendered.’  
As Mazer demonstrates, it is strikingly easy to move from an instrumental 
discussion of consequences to an assumption of just rewards.’
149
 
 
A system focusing more upon the ‘merit’ of the potentially infringing work, rather than 
one which emphasises the economic loss to the right holder, would be a move to 
rectifying this concern about the assumption of ‘just reward.’ It would thus break down 
the assumption that providing protection will increase the creative productivity of the 
populace. As the late Justice Laddie observed: 
 
‘When these ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice clanking their 
mediaeval chains, the proper course is for the judge to pass through them 
undeterred’150  
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